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Abstract
A probabilistic framework is introduced that represents stylized banking networks
and aims to predict the size of contagion events. In contrast to previous work on
random financial networks, which assumes independent connections between banks,
the possibility of disassortative edge probabilities (an above average tendency for
small banks to link to large banks) is explicitly incorporated. We give a probabilistic
analysis of the default cascade triggered by shocking the network. We find that
the cascade can be understood as an explicit iterated mapping on a set of edge
probabilities that converges to a fixed point. A cascade condition is derived that
characterizes whether or not an infinitesimal shock to the network can grow to a finite
size cascade, in analogy to the basic reproduction number R0 in epidemic modeling. It
provides an easily computed measure of the systemic risk inherent in a given banking
network topology. An analytic formula is given for the frequency of global cascades,
derived from percolation theory on the random network. Two simple examples are
used to demonstrate that edge-assortativity can have a strong effect on the level of
systemic risk as measured by the cascade condition. Although the analytical methods
are derived for infinite networks, large-scale Monte Carlo simulations are presented
that demonstrate the applicability of the results to finite-sized networks. Finally, we
propose a simple graph theoretic quantity, which we call “graph-assortativity”, that
seems to best capture systemic risk.
Key words: Systemic risk, banking network, contagion, random graph, cascade
condition, credit risk, financial mathematics, assortativity.
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1 Introduction
The study of contagion in financial systems is very topical in light of the recent global
credit crisis and the resultant damage inflicted on financial institutions. “Contagion”
refers to the spread of defaults through a system of financial institutions, with each
successive default causing increasing pressure on the remaining components of the
system. The term “systemic risk” refers to the contagion-induced threat to the fi-
nancial system as a whole, due to the default of one (or more) of its component
institutions.
It is widely held that financial systems (see Upper [2011] and references therein),
defined for example as the collection of banks and financial institutions in a developed
country, can be modelled as a random network of nodes or vertices with stylized bal-
ance sheets, connected by directed links or edges that represent exposures (“interbank
loans”), each edge with a positive weight that represents the size of the exposure. If
ever a node becomes “insolvent” and ceases to operate as a bank, it will create bal-
ance sheet shocks to other nodes, creating the potential of chains of insolvency that
we will call “default cascades”. Financial networks are difficult to observe because
interbank data is often not publicly available, but studies have indicated that they
share characteristics of other types of technological and social networks, such as the
world wide web and Facebook. For example, the degree distributions of financial
networks are thought to be “fat-tailed” since a significant number of banks are very
highly connected. A less studied feature observed in financial networks (and as it
happens, also the world wide web) is that they are highly “disassortative” (see New-
man [2002]). This refers to the property that any bank’s counterparties (i.e. their
graph neighbours) have a tendency to be banks of an opposite character. For exam-
ple, it is observed that small banks tend to link preferentially to large banks rather
than other small banks. Commonly, social networks are observed to be assortative
rather than disassortative. Structural characteristics such as degree distribution and
assortativity are felt to be highly relevant to the propagation of contagion in networks
but the nature of such relationships is far from clear.
Our aim here is to develop a mathematical framework that will be able to de-
termine the systemic susceptibility in a rich class of infinite random network models
with enough flexibility to include the most important structural characteristics of real
financial networks, in particular with general degree distributions and a prescribed
degree of edge-assortativity. Our starting point will be the Gai and Kapadia (here-
after referred to as GK for short) cascade model of Gai and Kapadia [2010] and the
analytical methods developed there and in Gleeson et al. [2011] for this model. The
basic assumptions introduced in the GK model are:
1. The network is a large (actually infinite) random directed graph with a pre-
scribed degree distribution;
2. Each node is labelled with a stylized banking balance sheet that identifies its
external assets and liabilities, its internal (i.e. total interbank) assets and liabili-
ties, and γ, its net worth or equity (i.e. its total assets minus its total liabilities).
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Initially, the system is in equilibrium, meaning each node has positive net worth
γ > 0.
3. Each directed edge is labelled with a deterministic weight that represents the
positive exposure of one bank to another. These weights depend deterministi-
cally on the in-degree of the edge, and are consistent with the interbank (IB)
assets and liabilities at each node;
4. A random shock is applied to the balance sheets in the system that triggers the
default or insolvency of a fixed fraction of nodes;
5. The residual value available to creditors of a defaulted bank is zero, and thus
the shock has the potential to trigger a cascade of further bank defaults.
The principle of limited liability for banks means that equity holders are never asked to
cover a negative net worth of an insolvent firm. Instead, the insolvent firm is assumed
to “default”, meaning it ceases to operate as a going concern, and its creditors divide
the residual value. Since this residual value is always less than the nominal liabilities,
creditor banks thus receive a shock to their balance sheets, creating the potential for
a default cascade. The GK model makes a very simple zero recovery assumption that
residual values of defaulted banks will be zero, and thus every time a bank defaults
a maximal possible shock will be transmitted to its creditors.
The framework for random financial networks presented here generalizes the GK
model in one important respect, namely that the edge degree distribution is arbitrary,
allowing for any desired amount of assortativity or disassortativity in the network.
Under these more general assumptions, we are able to prove our main result about
default cascades, which draws the following conclusions:
1. The probability that an edge is defaulted after n steps of the cascade depends
on the in-degree j of the edge, but not on the out-degree. Let these quantities
be denoted ~a(n) = {a(n)j }j∈Z+ ,Z+ := {0, 1, 2, . . . } for each value of the in-degree
j.
2. The sequence {~a(n)}n=0,1,... satisfies a recursion
~a(n+1) = G(~a(n)), n = 0, 1, . . .
where the monotonically increasing mapping G : [0, 1]Z+ → [0, 1]Z+ depends
explicitly on the structure of the network and the initial shock distribution.
An earlier result of this type was proved in Gleeson et al. [2011] in a situation in
which the probabilities a are independent of j, and G reduces to a scalar function.
One important implication of the above result is the so-called “cascade condition”
which is a statement about the derivative of G computed in the limit as the initial
shock goes to zero. It represents the condition that a tiny initial shock can create a
finite size cascade, and is the main analytical quantity that determines the stability
of the financial network. For example, with a given network structure, we are able to
compute a critical value γc of the net worth parameter that separates a no-cascade
region from a cascade region.
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The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 the extended
GK model is described in detail, and the analytical description of its solution is
given in Section 3. Section 4 discusses the cascade condition, and Section 5 derives a
formula for the frequency of large scale cascades arising from an infinitesimally small
seed. Numerical Monte Carlo simulation results and the corresponding analytical
predictions are compared for a simple class of networks in Section 6. This section
also investigates in more detail the relation between assortativity and systemic risk
in a richer family of infinite network examples. Section 7 concludes.
2 The Extended GK Model
In this section we completely specify the extended GK modelling framework for which
our analytical techniques will apply. The specification will consist of three levels:
first, the random directed graph model for the “skeleton” of the network; second, a
specification of balance sheet values corresponding to all nodes and edges; thirdly,
a specification of the type of initial shocks that will be considered. We shall work
within a probability space (ΩN ,FN ,P) for some N ≤ ∞, where a general outcome
ω ∈ ΩN is a directed graph with N nodes, with specified balance sheet values and an
initial shock.
2.1 The Skeleton Network
The first step in building a random financial network is to build the skeleton directed
graph that labels the banks and their interbank connections. Our construction is an
extension of the Erdo¨s-Renyi random graph model, and to describe it we introduce
certain graph theoretic definitions and notation:
1. A node v ∈ V = ∪jkVjk has type (j, k) means its in-degree is deg−(v) = j and
its out-degree is deg+(v) = k. We shall write kv = k, jv = j for any v ∈ Vjk and
allow degrees to be any non-negative integer.
2. An edge ` ∈ L = ∪kjLkj is said to have type (k, j) with in-degree j and out-
degree k if it is an out-edge of a node with out-degree k and an in-edge of a
node with in-degree j. We shall write deg+(`) = k` = k and deg
−(`) = j` = j
for any ` ∈ Lkj .
3. We write L+v (or L−v ) for the set of out-edges (respectively, in-edges) of a given
node v and v+` (or v
−
` ) for the node for which ` is an out-edge (respectively,
in-edge).
4. We will always write j, j′, j′′, etc. to refer to in-degrees while k, k′, k′′, etc. refer
to out-degrees.
Figure 1 illustrates the neighbourhood of a type (3, 2) bank. Our random graph
model is now characterized by a certain independence structure, and by probability
laws P,Q for nodes and edges.
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Figure 1: The skeleton structure of the network locality of a bank v. Bank v is in the
(j, k) = (3, 2) class, since it has 3 debtors and 2 creditors in the interbank (IB) network.
Definition 1. 1. For each j, k, Pjk := P[Vjk] is the probability of a type (j, k)
node. This distribution has marginals P+k :=
∑
j Pjk, P
−
j :=
∑
k Pjk.
2. For each j, k, Qkj := P[Lkj ] is the probability of a type (k, j) edge. This distri-
bution has marginals Q+k :=
∑
j Qkj , Q
−
j :=
∑
kQkj.
For any finite number of nodes N , a random graph with the required statistics can
be constructed by following a generalization of the “configuration graph” construction
used to construct Erdo¨s-Renyi graphs:
1. First, N degree pairs (jn, kn), n = 0, 1, . . . , N are drawn independently from the
P distribution. The nth node then has jn “in-stubs” and kn “out-stubs”.
2. Next, for each in-stub attached to a node with degree pair (j, k), j > 0 one
draws an out-degree k′ > 0 from the conditional distribution1 P[k` = k|j` =
j] = Qkj/Q
−
j : we can say the type of this in-stub is (k
′, j). The collection of
such draws is mutually independent.
3. Then, each in-stub of type (k, j) in succession is glued to a random out-stub
selected with uniform probability from all remaining unpaired out-stubs with
out-degree k. Again, the collection of such draws is mutually independent.
4. Finally, the graph is accepted if all in-stubs and out-stubs are paired, and re-
jected if not.
For a realization of the above finite N graph construction to be accepted, it is
necessary for the total number of in-stubs with any given out-degree k to equal the
number of out-stubs connected to nodes with this value of k. As N →∞, this leads by
1Recall the definition of conditional probability for any pair of sets of outcomes A,B:
P[A|B] = P[A ∩B]/P[B] .
5
the law of large numbers to a consistency condition relating the marginals of Q to the
marginals of P . Some further thought about the wiring of in-stubs to out-stubs leads
one to deduce certain independence properties of the random graph in the N = ∞
limit. Heuristically, any node v or edge ` divides the graph into “downstream” and
“upstream” parts. We can say that any downstream probability is independent of
the upstream graph and vice versa. Based on these considerations, we adopt the
following description of the random directed graph model:
Definition 2. For any N > 1 (including N = ∞), let Pjk, Qkj , j, k = 0, 1, . . . be
collections of node and edge probabilities, subject to the constraints
Q+k = kP
+
k /z, Q
−
j = jP
−
j /z
for all j, k, where the mean degree is z =
∑
k kP
+
k =
∑
j jP
−
j . For N < ∞, the
random directed graph model G(N,P,Q) is defined by the above configuration graph
construction. For N = ∞, the random directed graph model G(N = ∞, P,Q) is
instead characterized by the assumption of independence of downstream and upstream
probabilities, conditioned on the type of node or edge. This independence condition is
illustrated by the important case2: For all j, j′, j′′, k, k′, k′′,
P[v+` ∈ Vjk, v−` ∈ Vj′k′ |` ∈ Lk′′j′′ ] = δj′j′′δkk′′P[jv = j|kv = k] P[kv = k′|jv = j′] . (1)
Remark 3. (Independent edge condition) The special case Qkj = kjP
−
j P
+
k /z
2 =
Q−j Q
+
k arises when each in-stub is glued to an out-stub selected uniformly from the
collection of all un-paired out-stubs, and is the usual notion of random graph. We
are interested in the more general case described above because observed financial
networks do not appear to satisfy the independent edge condition. Apparently real fi-
nancial networks have the “edge-disassortative property” that high degree banks attach
preferentially to low degree banks.
Remark 4. A natural measure of edge-assortativity by degree is the “edge-assortativity
coefficient” rQ ∈ [−1, 1] given by
rQ =
∑
jk jk[Qkj −Q−j Q+k ]√(∑
j j
2Q−j − (
∑
j jQ
−
j )
2
) (∑
k k
2Q+k − (
∑
k kQ
+
k )
2
) . (2)
This quantity has been measured for the Brazilian banking network in Cont et al.
[2010] and found to be usually negative. However, we will find some evidence that sys-
temic risk of a network is related more strongly to a combination of edge-assortativity
and node-assortativity (arising from the dependence between in- and out- degrees of
2A conditional independence structure more general than (1), not arising from the above graph con-
struction, is analyzed in Bogun˜a´ and Serrano [2005].
6
nodes). We therefore define a measure we call the “graph-assortativity coefficient”
r ∈ [−1, 1] given by
r =
∑
jj′ jj
′[Bjj′ −B−j B+j′ ]√(∑
j j
2B−j − (
∑
j jB
−
j )
2
)(∑
j′ j
′2B+j′ − (
∑
j′ j
′B+j′ )2
) . (3)
where Bjj′ is the joint distribution of the in-degree of pairs of nodes connected by an
edge:
Bjj′ = P[jv = j, jv′ = j′|v is joined by a single out-edge ` to v′]
=
∑
k
PjkQkj′
P+k
,
and B−j =
∑
j′ Bjj′ , B
+
j′ =
∑
j Bjj′ are the marginals. Here, the formula for Bjj′ is
derived from (1).
Remark 5. We observe that infinite graphs in our framework are essentially “acyclic”,
meaning the probability that any given node will be contained in a cycle of edges of
any fixed length will be zero. This property is unlike what we observe in real financial
networks. Since infinite graphs are almost everywhere tree-like, one can understand
that the independence conditions (1) are part of a hierarchy of similar conditions for
edges and nodes in general position.
2.2 Balance Sheets
To build a financial network with full accounting information, consistent with a given
skeleton graph, one specifies the external assets Yv and external liabilities Zv for each
node v, and for each edge ` of the network, an exposure size or weight w`. All these
quantities are positive. From this one defines the net worth or buffer of a node v to
be
γv = Yv +
∑
`∈L−v
w` − Zv −
∑
`∈L+v
w` . (4)
We will always assume that the system is initially in a “cascade equilibrium” (or
“equilibrium” for short) in which all banks are solvent, which means that γv > 0 at
every node v. Thus γv can be thought of as a buffer that keeps the bank solvent when
subjected to balance sheet shocks up to a certain size.
The cascade dynamics in the GK framework do not depend on full accounting
information, but only on the partial information
{γv, v ∈ V} ∪ {w`, ` ∈ L}. (5)
We adopt a deterministic rule for which buffers may depend on the node type (j, k)
but the edge weights depend only on the in-degree deg−(`):{
γv = γjk, v ∈ Vjk
w` = wj , ` ∈ Lkj . (6)
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For the original GK model described in Gai and Kapadia [2010], which we will call
the GK specification, the following choices are made:
γjk = γ := 0.035; wj =
1
5j
,
but the analytical results of that paper clearly hold for general prescriptions of the
form (6).
Figure 2: Schematic balance sheet of banks in the (j, k) = (3, 2) class.
2.3 Shocks and the Solvency Condition
Insolvencies arise in a system initially in equilibrium only when a shock hits that is
hard enough to cause at least one node to suffer a loss larger than its buffer γv. For
simplicity, we suppose that such an initial shock to our system causes an initial set
W0 ⊂ V of nodes to become insolvent (for example by hitting their external assets),
but leaves other banks’ balance sheets unchanged. The set W0 is drawn randomly,
with the fraction of type (j, k) nodes that are defaulted denoted by
ρ0jk := P[v ∈ W0|v ∈ Vjk] .
Under the GK “zero recovery” assumption that an insolvent bank can pay none of
its interbank credit obligations, each insolvent node v ∈ W0 triggers all its out-edges
to have zero value. This triggering of edges to default is an instance of what we call
an “edge update” step of the cascade: corresponding to any default node setW there
is a default edge set M⊂ L defined by the condition ` ∈M if and only if v+` ∈ W.
8
Each such defaulted edge ` now transmits a maximal shock w` to the asset side
of the balance sheet of its in-node v−` (the creditor bank). If all balance sheets are
determined by the reduced accounting information {γjk} ∪ {wj}, then when M is a
set of defaulted edges, the solvency condition on a node v ∈ Vjk is3
γjk >
∑
`∈L−v
1{`∈M}wj .
This triggering of nodes to default we call a “node update” step of the cascade:
corresponding to the default edge set M there is a default node set W ′ defined by
the condition v ∈ W ′ if and only if
#{L−v ∩M} ≤Mjk := dγjk/wje , (7)
where (j, k) is the type of v. Here dxe denotes the “ceiling” function, i.e. the smallest
integer greater than or equal to x, and so Mjk is the threshold for the number of
defaulted in-edges that a type (j, k) node can sustain without itself defaulting.
To summarize, for N < ∞ and N = ∞, a specification (N,P,Q, γ, w, ρ0) of
an extended GK financial system is the following information: (i) the “skeleton”, a
G(N,P,Q) random directed graph defined by the probabilities Pjk, Qkj over all node
and edge types; (ii) a reduced accounting set, denoted by {γjk} ∪ {wj} and (iii) an
initial shocked set W0 with the default probabilities ρ0jk for each node type and the
corresponding defaulted edge set M0.
Given any realization of an extended GK financial system so specified, the com-
plete default cascade will be a deterministic alternating sequence of node and edge
updates (finite if N is finite), beginning with the initial shocked set W0 and its cor-
responding edge set M0. When N = ∞, the cascade can be fully resolved, and the
expected fraction of total defaulted nodes and edges (and other statistics) can be
determined by the inductive analysis given in the next section.
3 Default Cascade Steps
Given any realization of an extended GK financial system (N,P,Q, γ, w, ρ0) as spec-
ified above, with an initial shocked set W0 and the corresponding edge set M0, the
default cascade can be thought of as a sequence of updates:(W0
M0
)
→
(W0 ∪W1
M0 ∪M1
)
→
(W0 ∪W2
M0 ∪M2
)
· · · →
(W0 ∪Wn
M0 ∪Mn
)
→ . . .
Note that the above set unions are assumed to be disjoint, since we prefer to distin-
guish the initial default sets W0,M0 from the sets of “newly defaulted” nodes and
3The indicator function 1A of any set A is the random variable that is 1 on the set and 0 on its
complement.
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edges. Inductively, we have increasing sequences of sets:
Wn := defaulted nodes not in W0 “triggered” by edges in M0 ∪Mn−1 (8)
Mn := defaulted edges not in M0 “triggered” by nodes in W0 ∪Wn. (9)
When N = ∞ these random default sets Wn,Mn define probabilities for n =
0, 1, 2, . . .
ρnjk := P[v ∈ Wn|v ∈ Vjk] (10)
σnkj := P[` ∈Mn|` ∈ Lkj ] . (11)
Now the set M0 is determined from W0 by an edge update step. Similarly, for
each n ≥ 1 the setM0∪Mn is determined fromW0∪Wn by an edge update step. In
all these cases the probabilities σnkj are determined by the following general lemma.
Lemma 6. (Edge update) Let N =∞ and suppose W ⊂ V denotes a set of defaulted
nodes and for all j, k, ρjk := P[v ∈ W|v ∈ Vjk]. If the corresponding set of defaulted
edges is denoted M⊂ L then for all j, k
σkj := P[` ∈M|` ∈ Lkj ] =
∑
j′(ρj′kPj′k)
P+k
.
Proof: When N =∞ we may use the decomposition (1) and find
P[` ∈M|` = Lkj ] =
∑
j′
P[v+` ∈ W ∩ Vj′k|` = Lkj ]
=
∑
j′
P[v ∈ W|v ∈ Vj′k] P[v+` ∈ Vj′k|` = Lkj ]
=
∑
j′
ρj′kP[jv = j′|kv = k]
=
∑
j′(ρj′kPj′k)
P+k
.
Given any set M of defaulted edges, each of the nodes (excluding the initially
defaulted nodes in W0) recomputes its balance sheet and the node update step leads
to a subset W ⊂ V \W0 of defaulted nodes determined by M. We separate out the
originally defaulted nodes W0 since these were not triggered by defaulted edges. The
probabilities associated to W are characterized by the following result.
Lemma 7. (Node update) Let N =∞ and supposeM⊂ L denotes a set of defaulted
edges with associated probabilities σkj := P[` ∈M|` ∈ Lkj ]. Then for all j, aj defined
to be P[` ∈M|j` = j] is given by
aj =
∑
k(Qkjσkj)
Q−j
.
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If the corresponding subset of V \W0 of defaulted nodes triggered by M is denoted W
then for all j, k, ρjk := P[v ∈ W|v ∈ Vjk] is given by
ρjk = (1− ρ0jk)
j∑
m=Mjk
(
j
m
)
amj (1− aj)j−m
where the default thresholds are defined as in (7) by Mjk = dγjk/wje.
Proof: First we compute that
aj = P[` ∈M|j` = j] =
∑
k P[` ∈M∩Lkj ]
P[j` = j]
=
∑
k(Qkjσkj)
Q−j
. (12)
Note that P[` ∈M|v−` ∈ Vjk] = P[` ∈M|j` = j], that
P[v ∈ W|v ∈ Vjk] = P[v ∈ W|v ∈ Vjk\W0] P[v /∈ W0] = (1−ρ0jk)P[v ∈ W|v ∈ Vjk\W0] ,
(13)
and that a node v ∈ Vjk \W0 will be in default if and only if at least Mjk in-edges to
v are in M. By the independence structure of the network for N = ∞, the random
variables 1`∈M for all ` ∈ L−v , under the condition that v ∈ Vjk \W0, are a collection
of j identical independent Bernoulli random variables with probability aj . Putting
these facts together gives
P[v ∈ W|v ∈ Vjk \W0] =
j∑
m=Mjk
(
j
m
)
amj (1− aj)j−m
which combined with (13) leads to the required result.
Using these lemmas and the definitions (10),(11), it is straightforward to piece
together the steps of the default cascade and obtain the main result of the paper.
Proposition 8. Consider the infinite extended GK financial network (N =∞, P,Q, γ, w, ρ0).
For n = 0, 1, 2, . . . , let ~a(n) = {a(n)j } denote the probabilities P[` ∈ M0 ∪Mn|j` = j].
Then
1. For n = 0 we have
σ0kj =
∑
j′(ρ
0
j′kPj′k)
P+k
(14)
a
(0)
j =
∑
k(Qkjσ
0
kj)
Q−j
. (15)
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2. For n = 1, 2, . . . , the quantities ρn, σn, a(n) satisfy the recursive formulas
ρnjk = (1− ρ0jk)
j∑
m=Mjk
(
j
m
)
(a
(n−1)
j )
m(1− a(n−1)j )j−m (16)
σnkj =
∑
j′(ρ
n
j′kPj′k)
P+k
(17)
a
(n)
j =
∑
k(Qkj(σ
0
kj + σ
n
kj))
Q−j
, (18)
where Mjk = dγjk/wje. The total probability for defaulted (j, k) nodes at step
n is ρ0jk + ρ
n
jk and the total probability for defaulted (k, j) edges at step n is
σ0kj + σ
n
kj.
3. The new probabilities ~a(n) = {a(n)j } are a function G(~a(n−1)) which is explicit in
terms of the specification (N,P,Q, c, w, ρ0).
Proof: In Part 1, (14) follows from Lemma 6 and (15) from Lemma 7. Part 2 is
immediate from the same two lemmas, while Part 3 is simply a composition of (16),
(17), (18).
4 The Cascade Condition
The size of global cascades in an extended GK financial network with N = ∞ has
essentially been reduced to solving the fixed point equation
~a = G(~a) (19)
by iteration of the mapping G. Scalar equations of this sort, giving the expected
size of cascades on directed networks, have been previously derived in various con-
texts Gleeson [2008b], Amini et al. [2010]. In Gleeson [2008b], the main focus is on
percolation-type phenomena (see also the undirected networks case Gleeson [2008a]),
while Amini et al. [2010] considers more complicated dynamics but takes the limit
ρ0 → 0. The case considered in Gleeson et al. [2011], where initial default fractions
can be different for each (j, k) class, has not, to our knowledge, been considered pre-
viously. In the current work, we include for the first time (through Qkj) the effect
of non-trivial correlations between the degrees of nodes at either end of a randomly
chosen edge.
As a consequence of the Knaster-Tarski Theorem, equation (19) always has at
least one solution ~a∞ and this will be a vector of probabilities a∞j ∈ [0, 1] for all j.
To see this one observes that G is a monotone mapping from the complete lattice
[0, 1]Z+ onto itself, under the partial ordering relation defined by ~a ≤ ~b if and only if
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aj ≤ bj for all j ∈ Z+, that is, G(~a) ≤ G(~b) whenever ~a ≤ ~b. This is enough to ensure
the existence of at least one fixed point on the set [0, 1]Z+ .
One important question is to consider initial points ~a for small  > 0 and ask
whether the fixed points ~a∞() obtained this way are of order  or of order 1 as → 0.
In other words, what is the “cascade condition” that determines if an infinitesimally
small seed fraction will grow to a large-scale cascade? This depends on the spectral
radius of the derivative matrix D = {Djj′} with Djj′ = ∂Gj/∂aj′ |~a=0,ρ0=0. Recalling
that the spectral radius of a matrix D, ‖D‖ := max~a:‖~a‖=1 ‖D~a‖, is the magnitude of
the largest eigenvalue of D, one can see by a version of the Perron-Frobenius Theorem
for non-negative infinite matrices, that the fixed points ~a∞() will be O() if ‖D‖ < 1
and will be O(1) if ‖D‖ > 1. Such a “cascade condition” plays a role in systemic risk
analogous to the basic reproduction number R0 in epidemiology. In our framework,
the derivatives Djj′ turn out to be easy to calculate and we find:
Proposition 9. The infinite extended GK financial network (N =∞, P,Q, γ, w, ρ0)
satisfies the cascade condition, that is, any infinitesimal seed will trigger a large scale
cascade almost surely, if the spectral radius ‖D‖ > 1 where
Djj′ =
∑
k
j′QkjPj′k1{γj′k≤wj′}
Q−j P
+
k
. (20)
If ‖D‖ < 1, then almost surely the network will not exhibit large scale cascades for
any infinitesimal seed.
In Section 6, we shall see that the cascade condition is indeed a strong measure
of systemic risk in finite simulated networks. One can check that in the setting of
independent edge probabilities, the mapping G reduces to a scalar function, a result
that has been derived in a rather different fashion in Gai and Kapadia [2010]. They
extend Watts’ Watts [2002] percolation theory approach from his work on undirected
networks to the case of directed nonassortative networks. We will see in the next
section that the percolation approach to the cascade condition extends further to our
directed assortative networks.
We can understand the cascade condition more clearly by introducing the notion
of vulnerable node, that is any node that becomes insolvent if any one of its debtors
defaults. In our specifications, a (j, k) node is thus vulnerable if and only if γjk ≤ wj .
The matrix element Djj′ has a simple explanation that gives more intuition about the
nature of the cascade condition: it is the expected number of edges `′ with j`′ = j′
that connect through a vulnerable node to an edge ` with j` = j. Then for small
values of ~a, one has a linear approximation for the change in ~a in a single cascade
step:
am+1j − amj =
∑
j′
Djj′ (a
m
j′ − am−1j′ ) +O(‖a‖2) . (21)
The condition for a global cascade starting from an infinitesimal seed is that the
matrix D must have an expanding direction, i.e. an eigenvalue bigger than 1.
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5 Frequency of global cascades and the giant
vulnerable cluster
The previous argument does not tell us directly about the frequency of global cas-
cades. However, it is well-known [Newman, 2010, Chapter 13.11] that the frequency
of global cascades in infinite random graphs is given by the fractional size of the
so-called in-component associated to the giant vulnerable cluster.
To facilitate the discussion we make the following further definitions
• V(v) is the set of vulnerable nodes.
• Ss is the giant strongly connected set of vulnerable nodes (the “giant vulnerable
cluster”);
• Si is the set of (possibly not vulnerable) nodes that are forward connected to
Ss by a path of vulnerable nodes (the “in-component” of the giant vulnerable
cluster);
• Γjk = 1{γjk≤wj}.
We are interested in the following probabilities ~b = (bk), bk := P[v /∈ Si|kv = k]
and note that v ∈ Sci (i.e. the complement of Si) is equivalent to the condition that
all the downstream nodes v−` , ` ∈ L+v are in the set (Sci ∩ V(v)) ∪ Vc(v). Thus, letting
v′ denote any node one edge downstream from v, one has:
bk = (ck)
k , (22)
where
ck =
∑
j′,k′
P[v′ ∈ (Sci ∩ V(v)) ∪ Vc(v)|v′ ∈ Vj′k′ , k` = k]P[v′ ∈ Vj′k′ |k` = k] .
Next note
P[v′ ∈ (Sci ∩ V(v)) ∪ Vc(v))|v′ ∈ Vj′k′ , k` = k] = Γj′k′bk′ + (1− Γj′k′)
P[v′ ∈ Vj′k′ |k` = k] =
Pj′k′Qkj′
P−j′Q
+
k
and thus
ck =
∑
j′,k′
(
Γj′k′bk′ + (1− Γj′k′)
) Pj′k′Qkj′
P−j′Q
+
k
. (23)
Since bk = (ck)
k it follows that ~c = (ck) satisfies the fixed point equation ~c = h(~c)
where for any sequence c = (ck)
hk(c) =
∑
j′,k′
(
Γj′k′(ck′)
k′ + (1− Γj′k′)
) Pj′k′Qkj′
P−j′Q
+
k
. (24)
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Note that the equation ~c = h(~c) has a trivial fixed point ~e = (1, 1, . . . ) that
corresponds to the set Si having probability zero. We now verify that the cascade
condition ‖D‖ > 1 is equivalent to the condition that e is an unstable fixed point, in
which case there will be a nontrivial fixed point 0 ≤ ~c∞ < ~e. A sufficient (and almost
necessary) condition for e to be an unstable fixed point is that ‖D˜‖ > 1 where the
derivative D˜kk′ = (∂hk/∂ck′)|~c=~e is given by
D˜kk′ =
∑
j′
k′Qkj′Pj′k′Γj′k′
Q+k P
−
j′
. (25)
One can verify directly that
D˜ =
(
ΛBAΛ−1
)T
, D = AB
for matrices
Ajk =
Qkj
Q−j
, Bkj′ =
j′Pj′kΓj′k
P+k
, Λkk′ = δkk′kP
+
k
and from this it follows that the spectral radii and spectral norms of D˜ and D are
equal. Hence ‖D‖ > 1 if and only if ‖D˜‖ > 1.
As long as the cascade condition is satisfied, the cascade frequency f equals the
fractional size of the in-component Si and is given by
f =
∑
k
P[v ∈ Si|kv = k] P[kv = k] =
∑
k
(1− ck,∞)P+k . (26)
Repeating this type of argument to determine the size of the out-component of
the giant vulnerable cluster, one also obtains an upper bound on the size of the global
cascade.
6 Numerical Results
In this section we present results from large-scale Monte Carlo simulations on random
networks, and show that the analytical theory of Section 3 for N =∞ matches well
to the numerical results when N , the number of nodes in the network, is sufficiently
large.
6.1 A Simple Random Network Model
We consider networks constructed with nodes of types (3, 3), (3, 12), (12, 3), (12, 12)
and edges of the same types. We fix the marginal probabilities P+3 = P
+
12 = 1/2
which lead to an average degree z = 15/2 and the marginals Q+3 = 1/5, Q
+
12 = 4/5.
For parameters a ∈ [0, 1/2] and b ∈ [0, 1/5] the following P and Q probabilities are
consistent:(
P3,3 P3,12
P12,3 P12,12
)
=
(
1/2− a a
a 1/2− a
)
;
(
Q3,3 Q3,12
Q12,3 Q12,12
)
=
(
1/5− b b
b 4/5− b
)
.
(27)
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We first fix the value of a to be 0.5, which means that the in- and out-degrees of
all nodes are negatively correlated: nodes with in-degree 3 have out-degree 12, and
vice versa. We examine three different values of the parameter b: the independent
connections case b = 0.16, the (almost) maximally assortative case b = 0.01 and the
(almost) maximally disassortative case b = 0.19. Note that the independent edge
condition has been assumed in all previous work on such problems. We also note
that with b = 0, edges are maximally assortative and link nodes of out-degree 3 to
nodes of in-degree 3 only, and nodes of out-degree 12 to nodes of in-degree 12 only.
In this case, the network falls into two disjoint pieces.
The balance sheet quantities are those of Gai and Kapadia [2010] (except for the
percentage net worth γ, which we vary over the range 0% to 10%), while the initial
shock distribution is taken to be ρ0jk = 1/N for all types (j, k), corresponding to the
shocking of a single, randomly-chosen, bank.
Generating a finite size skeleton network with prescribed probabilities following
the steps outlined in section 2.1 always encounters the difficulty of ensuring that the
consistency condition for wiring the network is exact. The naive approach would be
to accept any randomly drawn set of node types {(jn, kn)}n=1,...,N only if the consis-
tency condition is satisfied: one can easily see that even for our simple probability
specification the rejection rate will be extremely high, and the method very slow.
Instead one in practice adopts some approximation that we call “clipping”: given
an inconsistent labelling, one selects random pairs of nodes, and “rewires” a small
number of times to ensure the consistency conditions. Such a procedure may create
a small bias that vanishes as N →∞.
Figure 3 compares theory curves for cascade size (found by iterating equations
(14)–(18) to convergence) as well as cascade frequency (given by (26)) with results
from numerical simulations on random networks with N = 104, 103 and 102 nodes.
The nodal correlation parameter is fixed at a = 0.5, while the edge correlation pa-
rameter takes the values b = 0.01, 0.16, 0.19. Results are plotted as functions of the
percentage net worth parameter γ. In each case, 500 realizations are used to find the
extent of global cascades (a global cascade is defined, similarly to Gai and Kapadia
[2010], Gleeson et al. [2011], as one in which more than 5% of nodes default), and
the frequency with which such global cascades occur. As expected, the analytical
approach accurately predicts the size of the global cascades. Some discrepancies may
be noted in Figure 3, where the theory does not predict some global cascades, but
note that these occur with only very small frequencies.
The cascade condition (20) predicts that the critical values of the buffer parameter
γ are: γc = 0.067 for the parameters of Figure 3(a), and γc = 0.017 for the case of
Figure 3(b). These values match very accurately to the locations of the dramatic
transitions in the theory curve (and in the expected size of cascades in numerical
experiments): for buffer values in excess of γc global cascades are extremely rare,
while for γ values less than γc the entire financial system is likely to fail following
a single bank’s default. These result indicate the potential usefulness of the cascade
condition as a measure of systemic risk.
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We consider in Figure 4 the joint dependences on a, b of various theoretical quanti-
ties in the large N limit. In the top figures, the critical value of γ and cascade size are
seen to be discontinuous, and not directly related to edge-assortativity (parametrized
by b). On the other hand (see bottom figures), the frequency of cascades is contin-
uously varying, and does appear to correlate somewhat with the graph assortativity
coefficient r given by (3).
6.2 Another Simple Random Network Model
Now we have shown that the infinite N theory meets our expectations, we can further
explore the implications of the analytical method. Since the specification of extended
GK networks has many components, one must be rather careful in the questions one
wishes to address: we choose here to try by means of a simple network specification
to shed some additional light on the role the assortative properties of a network play
in its susceptibility to systemic risk as measured by the cascade frequency.
We consider stylized networks with many small banks and a few large banks.
The set of node types will be {(2, 2), (4, 4), (8, 8), (16, 16)} with a diagonal node
probability matrix:
P := (Pjk) = diag(8, 4, 2, 1)/15 .
The following edge probability matrices Q = (Qkj) are consistent with P :
Q(1) =
1
4

1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
 , Q(2) = 14

0 1 0 0
1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1
0 0 1 0
 ,
Q(3) =
1
4

0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
 , Q(4) = 14

0 0 0 1
0 0 1 0
0 1 0 0
1 0 0 0
 ,
and their convex combinations q1Q1 +q2Q2 +q3Q3 +q4Q4, q1 +q2 +q3 +q4 = 1, qi ≥ 0
span a simplex of possible edge probability matrices. We can see that as measured by
rQ, Q
(1) is maximally assortative, while Q(3) and Q(4) are maximally disassortative,
and the independent case is Q(0) := [Q(1) +Q(2) +Q(3) +Q(4)]/4.
For the remaining components of the specification we adopt the default GK bal-
ance sheet values but with γ a variable parameter and consider shocking a single
randomly selected node (this is an infinitesimal shock in infinite volume). We then
compute the critical γc using the cascade formula (20), the cascade size from Propo-
sition 8, and the default frequency using equation (26).
Figure 5 shows how the theoretical values of γc and cascade size depend on the
particular Q matrix. Figure 6 shows how the theoretical values of the graph assor-
tativity coefficient and cascade frequency depend on Q. In both figures, the four
rows correspond to the simplices of Q matrices with q4 = 0, q3 = 0, q2 = 0, q1 = 0
respectively.
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We see again in these networks that r and f vary continuously, while γc and
cascade size take on only discrete values. Of particular interest is the discernable
covariation of f with r. Since r depends only on the skeleton graph and not on the
balance sheet data, we cannot expect a one-to-one relationship between the quantities
f and r. However, we conjecture that r is in some sense the best possible purely
graph theoretic measure of systemic susceptibility. Heuristically, we might expect
that systemic risk is lowered if, all else being equal, the network is such that the
correlation between in-degrees of neighbouring nodes is lowered.
7 Concluding Remarks
In summary, we have described here a rigorous analytical framework which can pre-
dict the systemic risk of “deliberately simplified models” such as Gai and Kapadia
[2010]. The qualitative type of networks one can address has been extended con-
siderably over existing work, in particular by the inclusion of the non-independent
connections between nodes. The example of Subsection 6.1 demonstrates that finite
size effects do not appear to dramatically impact systemic risk as long as N & 100.
More subtly, we also observed that graph-assortativity, rather than edge- or node-
assortativity, can strongly affect the course of contagion cascades, and hence show
the importance of incorporating assortativity in numerical and analytical treatments
of banking network models. Our framework will enable extensive studies of alter-
native network topologies; the cascade condition and cascade frequency provide two
simple and useful measures of systemic risk by which to compare different network
topologies. However, the daunting range of network variables means that both ana-
lytical and numerical studies must be carefully framed to address specific issues, for
example, to uncover other key determinants of systemic risk. Finally, we anticipate
that future work can show how the approach described here may be further extended
to include partial recovery models (such as Nier et al. [2007]) and stochastic balance
sheets.
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Figure 3: Numerical simulation results (symbols) and theoretical results (curves) for the
random network model of Equation (27), on networks of N nodes with parameter a = 0.5,
as functions of the net worth γ. The average size and frequency of global cascades in
simulations are shown by red circles and blue crosses, respectively. Theoretical results for
the expected cascade size (black solid curve) are from Section 3; those for the frequency
of cascades (dashed magenta curve) are from Section 5. Each column shows results for a
different network size N , and the parameter b takes a different value on each row of the
figure.
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Figure 4: Theoretical joint dependences on the graph parameters (a, b). Top left: critical γ
value for the random network model of Equation (27). Top right: Expected size of cascades
(from Section 3) when γ = 0.05 and ρ0jk = 10
−4. Bottom left: the graph assortativity
parameter r. Bottom right: Frequency of cascades (from Section 5) when γ = 0.05.
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Figure 5: Critical value of γ (left column) and expected size (right column) for cascades on
the random network model of Section 6.2 with γ = 0.0375 and ρ0jk = 10
−4. The triangles
shown correspond to Q matrices with (from top to bottom) q4 = 0, q3 = 0, q2 = 0, and
q1 = 0.
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Figure 6: Graph assortativity parameter r (left column) and frequency (right column) for
the same parameters as Fig. 5.
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